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Introduction

*
Over the past few decades, representatives of historically marginalized groups have increasingly found their way into the world's national legislatures. Changes in the political representation of women and indigenous peoples 1 have been particularly remarkable. For example, between 1993 and 2013, women's share of seats in the average national legislature more than doubled, from 8.6% to 21.8% (IPU 2013) . Over the same time period, indigenous peoples, who account for between 4 and 5 percent of the world's population, began to more actively engage in electoral politics, sometimes producing sizeable gains in indigenous representation (e.g., Hall and Patrinos 2010; IWGIA 2014; Madrid 2005; Van Cott 2005 Yashar 2005) .
For both women and indigenous peoples in many countries, the path to greater political inclusion has involved quotas-laws or policies requiring candidate lists or representative bodies to include members of targeted groups. Indeed, by 2010, more than 60 states had written gender quotas into their electoral laws or constitutions (Paxton and Hughes forthcoming) . Although less numerous, quotas for indigenous tribes and nomadic peoples (hereafter called 'indigenous quotas') are also used all over the world, including in Latin America (e.g., Gunas in Panama), the Middle East (e.g., Bedouin in Jordan), sub-Saharan Africa (e.g., Twa in Burundi), Asia (e.g., Adivasi in India), and the Pacific (e.g., Māori in New Zealand).
Typically, policies designed to promote the representation of women and indigenous groups do not interact with one another. Indeed, many countries have gender or indigenous quotas. Even when countries have both gender and indigenous quotas, policies are often designed differently and implemented as separate systems (Htun 2004; Krook and O'Brien 2010) . In Colombia, for example, lists submitted for election of 5 or more seats must include 30% women (IDEA 2014) , but only one seat is set aside for indigenous peoples, precluding any interaction between the two policies.
The isolation and separation of gender and indigenous quotas may have negative consequences for those affected by both policies -indigenous women. The economic, cultural, and political circumstances of indigenous women often put them at a political disadvantage (Hughes 2013) . Consequently, gender quotas may benefit women from dominant groups, and indigenous quotas may benefit indigenous men. The exclusion of indigenous women from political leadership may have broad consequences, as representation in legislatures has been shown to influence policymaking (Paxton and Hughes 2013; Chin and Prakash 2011) , reduce feelings of political alienation (Bieber 2004; Farrell and Scully 2007) , and increase aspirations of group members (Campbell and Wolbrecht 2006; Johnson, Kabuchu, and Kayonga 2003) .
Quotas may be designed and implemented in ways that enhance electoral opportunities for indigenous women. Countries may adopt "nested quotas" -policies requiring some portion of seats or candidate list positions go to a targeted subset of members. Nested quotas for indigenous women are exceptionally rare in national politics. Terminology for indigenous peoples is highly variable and contested. Some terms are more common or are preferred in certain countries or regions (for example, "first peoples/nations," "native," "aboriginal," "adivasi," and "janajati"). Other terms refer to worklife or habitat (for example, "hunter-gatherers," "nomads," "peasants," "forest dwellers," "pastoralists," and "hill people") of particular groups (Hill and Patrinos 2010:12) .
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In this paper, I reserve the term 'nested quota' to refer specifically to policies that guarantee within-group diversity. Quotas that use a shared mechanism to ensure the representation of more than one group are not necessarily nested Jirga for Kuchi nomads, setting aside at least three seats for women. And in 2012, Jordan adopted a nested quota for Bedouin women. Interestingly, however, research on quotas in Afghanistan and Jordan has paid scant attention to the nested quality of the policies and to the specific electoral fortunes of indigenous women (e.g., Dababneh 2012; Dahlerup and Nordland 2004; Krook, O'Brien, and Swip 2010; Nahar and Humaidan 2013) . Consequently, we know little about the reasons why nested quotas for indigenous women were adopted.
In this paper, I focus on the relationship between quota design and indigenous women's representation in national legislatures. I begin by providing a brief discussion about defining and identifying indigenous groups worldwide. Next, I look broadly at the effects of indigenous and gender quotas on indigenous women's political representation across 40 countries with sizeable indigenous populations. Then, I turn to nested quotas, focusing in particular on the case of Jordan. I explore the circumstances that fueled the 2012 policy targeting Bedouin women.
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Worldwide: Definition and Identification
What it means to be indigenous and who might "count" as an indigenous person is contested, variable, context-specific, and shifting (e.g. Canessa 2006; de la Cadena 2000; Martínez Novo 2006) . There is no single or widely accepted definition for indigenous and tribal peoples. Instead, research and advocacy groups generally rely on a range of criteria to identify groups. For example, the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations highlights four identifying features: 1) historical antecedence; 2) cultural distinctiveness, including "aspects of language, social organisation, religion and spiritual values, modes of production, laws and institutions"; 3) self-identification as a distinct collectivity, 4) and experience of "subjugation, marginalisation, dispossession, exclusion or discrimination, whether or not these conditions persist" (Saugestad 2008:165) .
Such criteria generate a heterogeneous category of peoples whose structural circumstances, cultures, political orientations, and daily lives vary greatly within and between groups. For example, indigenous peoples differ in the extent to which they maintain geographic continuity with their ancestral elders. Some indigenous people reside in their territorial "homelands", whereas others have been pushed by forces such as state policy, industry, climate change, and armed conflict into diaspora communities (Baguio Declaration 2012; Clifford 2007; Levi and Maybury-Lewis 2010) .
Using self-identification to determine indigeneity is complicated by shifting levels of identification with the term "indigenous." As historically marginalized groups join transnational networks and alliances, some groups are "becoming indigenous" (Hodgson 2011) , sometimes described as an "indigenous awakening" (e.g., Brysk 2000; Stavenhagen 2002 ). Indigenous groups may construct themselves as such to secure funding from international agencies, to leverage international treaties such as the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, or to articulate demands for resources, access, rights, or representation from states (Laurie et al. 2002; IWGIA 2014) .
States, too, play a role in constructing indigeneity. Some countries do not recognize any of their native peoples as "indigenous groups," sometimes actively resisting what they see as strategic attempts by groups to make use of an "imported idea" (Li 2000:150) . On the other end of the spectrum, when governments adopt quotas or other mechanisms to afford political representation or access to indigenous peoples, they must decide which people get representation or access. Research suggests there is often substantial arbitrariness in the ways some people are categorized as indigenous while others are not (e.g. Lee 2003; Li 2000; Shah 2010; Tsing 2004) . (Contd.) quotas. For example, in Burundi, three seats are set aside for the Twa, a semi-nomadic indigenous group sometimes referred to as "pygmies". There is also a 30% gender quota. The same mechanism -co-optation -ensures that both quotas are met. But, there is no requirement that any of the reserved seats for Twa go to women. Hence, I do not count Burundi as having a nested quota for indigenous women.
For this paper, I used a practical approach to identify indigenous groups around the world. I drew from the classifications of governments and organizations -including self-identified indigenous organizations. I then collected data on the composition of national legislatures in countries where indigenous groups comprise at least 1% of the population. I was able to secure data on 40 countries, 26 of which elected at least one indigenous legislator. For much of the analyses below, I focus on the quota policies and indigenous women's representation in these 26 countries: 4 have indigenous quotas, 7 have national gender quotas, 4 have both indigenous and gender quotas, and 11 have neither type of quota.
Indigenous Quotas and the Political Representation of Indigenous Women
Quotas for indigenous tribal groups are not a new phenomenon.
3 In some countries, policies are a holdover from British colonialism. Despite increasing political incorporation of indigenous groups, significant barriers to indigenous women's representation remain. Barriers to women's political representation such as poverty and a lack of education may be particularly salient in some tribal cultures. Moreover, some indigenous groups maintain traditional decision-making structures that exclude women. Groups wishing to preserve these traditional structures may resist women's claims for political inclusion as imported, inconsistent with group ways of life.
To challenge their exclusion, indigenous women have started to participate in indigenous movements in higher numbers, carving out spaces in existing indigenous organizations and forming their own networks. For example, in Mexico, women have formed a separate indigenous organization, the Coordinadora Nacional de Mujeres Indígenas de México (CNMIM) (Hernández Castillo 2010; Kampwirth 2002 Kampwirth , 2004 Sierra 2001 Sierra , 2007 . As indigenous political movements have pressed for inclusion in national electoral bodies, indigenous women, too, have pressed for seats at the table. For example, CNMIM in Mexico demanded women's equal inclusion in all political spaces and institutions.
Are indigenous women's claims getting through? When states guarantee indigenous groups representation, what are the consequences for indigenous women? In general, just a handful of studies have considered the ways that quotas for racial, ethnic, or religious minority groups have affected 3 Indigenous quotas -like quotas for other groups -vary in the ways they are designed and implemented (e.g., Bird 2014; Dahlerup 2006; Krook 2009; Reynolds 2005 Reynolds , 2006 . In counting quotas for indigenous groups, I exclude policies that create districts in overseas constituencies (e.g., France), autonomous or semiautonomous regions (e.g., Inuits in Denmark), and other majority-minority districts (e.g., tribal groups in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas), unless eligibility rules guarantee indigenous groups seats in these districts (e.g., Rotuma in Fiji).
women (Htun 2004; Hughes 2011; Tan 2014) . None of these has looked, in particular, at the indigenous quotas on indigenous women.
Here, I look briefly at four cases: New Zealand, Fiji, Venezuela, and India. Each of these countries has indigenous quotas but no national gender quotas. These countries suggest no certain relationship between indigenous quotas and indigenous women's representation. On one end of the spectrum, New Zealand is a stand-out case, the only country to elect indigenous women at a level higher than their population. On the other end of the spectrum, Fiji (2006) and Venezuela (2010) reserved seats for indigenous groups but elected no women. India falls between the two extremes, electing women to nearly 18 percent of seats occupied by scheduled tribes in 2009. Overall, these results suggest that indigenous quotas are certainly not a panacea for indigenous women. But, they do not exclusively benefit indigenous men either. Next, I consider the ways that national gender quotas affect indigenous women's representation.
Gender Quotas and the Political Representation of Indigenous Women
The rapid spread of gender quotas around the world is arguably one of the most significant political developments of the last quarter century (Hughes, Krook, and Paxton 2013) . Quotas are designed to "jumpstart" women's political representation -to move from incremental change to substantial gains (Dahlerup 2006; Dahlerup and Friedenvall 2005) Despite the success of gender quotas in increasing women's descriptive representation, or numerical presence, we know much less about the ways that gender quotas affect women from marginalized groups. Political theorists caution that by addressing only one dimension of inequality at a time, quotas may reinforce within-group inequalities (e.g., Mansbridge 2005; Phillips 1994 Phillips , 2012 Young 1994 Young , 1997 ). Yet, empirical research on women's legislative outcomes has yet to bear this out, generally finding that national gender quotas help -or at least do not hurt -the electoral outcomes of minority women (Celis et al. 2014; Hughes 2011) . Although women from dominant groups may benefit most from national gender quotas, women from racial, ethnic, and religious minority groups can share in the returns (Hughes 2011) .
Presently, however, no research has asked how gender quotas affect women from indigenous and tribal groups. To examine this question, I compare indigenous women's representation in the 7 countries that have national gender quotas (but no indigenous quotas) and the 15 do not. 4 Notably, countries in these two groups have indigenous populations that are similar in average size (roughly 8-9% of the population). I assess indigenous women's representation in these countries in two ways. First, I calculate indigenous women's share of seats in the national legislature relative to their population share, a measure of proportionality. Second, I calculate women's share of all indigenous seats, a measure of indigenous women's representation relative to indigenous men's. mixed. On the one hand, indigenous women are represented at levels farther from their share of the population in countries with national gender quotas than in countries without them. In countries with only national gender quotas, indigenous women are just 7% of the way towards proportional representation. This same figure is more than twice as large in countries without national gender quotas. By this metric, gender quotas do not appear favorable to indigenous women.
On the other hand, indigenous women are represented at higher levels relative to indigenous men in countries with gender quotas than in countries without them. Women hold an average of 23% of indigenous seats in countries with gender quotas, but only 13% of indigenous seats in countries without gender quotas. By this metric, gender quotas appear to be helping indigenous women secure representation.
What explains this paradoxical result? In countries with gender quotas, indigenous peoples have a smaller seat share overall, but women are better represented in those seats. Closer examination reveals that two cases -Ecuador and Peru -are driving women's higher share of indigenous seats. In Ecuador in 2010, indigenous women held 3 out of 5 indigenous seats, and in Peru, only one indigenous legislator was elected in 2001, a woman. In the other 5 countries with national gender quotas, indigenous men were elected, but indigenous women were not. The relationship between indigenous representation in the legislature and women's share of indigenous seats is summarized in Figure 2 below. In this figure, it becomes clear that indigenous women are not very well represented in countries with national gender quotas alone.
Overall, these results mirror what we know already about the effects of national gender quotas on the electoral fortunes of women from marginalized groups. Gender quotas may not stand in the way of indigenous women's election; they may even help indigenous women get elected in places where indigenous groups are represented at lower levels overall. But, expansive gender quotas and high levels of indigenous representation are rarely found in the same country, limiting indigenous women's progress towards proportional representation alongside indigenous men.
Combining Gender and Indigenous Quotas
What about countries with both gender and indigenous quotas? Even in countries with both polices, there is no guarantee that quotas will benefit indigenous women. Depending on the specific features of the quotas -and how those features interact with one another -dual quotas can produce a range of different outcomes for women from marginalized groups (Hughes 2011) .
Of particular importance is the scope of the quota, the number of legislative seats or candidate list positions that are affected. If one or both quotas target few seats in the legislature, quotas may be less likely to benefit women from marginalized groups (Hughes 2011) . A country that illustrates this concern is Colombia. Just one seat in the House of Representatives is set aside for indigenous peoples, precluding any interaction between the indigenous quota and the 30% gender quota. In 2010, two indigenous representatives were elected, one through the reserved seat and one through an indigenous political party, and neither representative is a woman. Given that indigenous quotas are often small, operating on the margins, the simultaneous presence of gender and indigenous quotas may still leave indigenous women behind.
One way to guarantee that indigenous women are included in politics is to use a nested quota. That is, countries could require that some share of indigenous seats or list positions go to women, or to require that some share of women's seats or list positions go to representatives of indigenous groups. Presently, such policies are exceptionally rare at the national level. In 2005, Afghanistan implemented reserved seats for both women and Kuchis, a nomadic Pashtun group from southern and eastern parts of Afghanistan (MRGI 2014) . Of the 10 seats set aside for Kuchis, at least three seats were reserved for women. In 2012, Jordan become the second country in the world to adopt a nested quota for tribal women when it expanded its existing gender quota to apply to electoral districts restricted to Bedouins.
Given that nested quotas for indigenous women are a guaranteed method for ensuring their representation, it is important to unpack the specifics of the quota. Does the quota mirror Afghanistan's policy, or does Jordan's policy represent an innovation in quota design? Why did Jordan adopt a quota for Bedouin women? Examining the circumstances surrounding the policy's adoption may help us to understand whether we will see additional nested quotas for indigenous women in the future, and if so, where.
Explaining the Adoption of a Quota for Bedouin Women in Jordan
Compared to many other parts of the world, tribalism is a much more central part of life in Jordan. During the more than 30 year ban on political parties, tribes filled the void, linking the state to society (Majed 2005) . To get elected to politics, candidates first seek the support of their tribe. However, not people are equally likely to receive tribal support. As Tabaa (2008:12) explains, men are preferred candidates, due to symbolic understandings of "the tribal representative as a male identity" and to the view that men may "better able to acquire the desired services for the tribe through their accumulated social capital."
It is perhaps not surprising, then, that women have generally faced difficulty getting elected in Jordanian politics. The first woman was not elected to parliament in Jordan until 1993, when Toujan al-Faisal was elected to a seat reserved for Circassian religious minorities (see Appendix Table A1 for the numbers of Bedouins, women, and Bedouin women elected from 1989 to 2013). But, in 1997, the number of women elected again returned to zero. This failure of women to secure representationalong with increasing pressure from domestic and international groups -set the stage for change ( In 2003, Jordan adopted a national gender quota, reserving 6 of 110 seats for women (5.5%). Rather than creating separate women's districts or lists -which has generated criticism elsewhere in the world (see, for example, Bauer 2008) -the quota implemented a "lucky loser" system: the six women who received the highest percentage of votes in their district (but had not won seats in their own right) were afforded a quota seat. Because the quota seats supplemented women elected without the quota, the six seats offered a floor rather than a ceiling for women's political representation. Supporters of the quota hoped that women who won parliamentary seats through the quota could subsequently leverage their experience into wins outside of the quota system. Because electoral districts in Jordan are not uniformly sized, the criteria for selecting women into quota seatsthe percentage of votes by district -means that it is much easier for women from less populated rural and tribal districts to win. Before the 2003 election took place, women activists voiced their concern that women from urban areas, where the most educated and politically active women reside, would be underrepresented (Clark 2006) . They were right. In 2003, five of the six women elected came from rural areas. That no woman from the capital was elected was a source of considerable disappointment for many women's organizations (Abu Rumman 2007).
Some in Jordan expected the quota would not last. The interior ministry official responsible for administering the quota insisted the policy was a "one-time gift" from the monarchy (Al-Tal 2007; cited from David and Nanes 2011) . Others hoped the quota would be expanded. Shortly after the 2003 elections, women's organizations and human rights organizations called for a 30% quota (Majed 2005) . But, the 2003 policy remained in place, untransformed, and in the 2007 election, women's outcomes changed very little. Seven women were elected -including one woman elected outside of the quota -but again women running in Amman were unsuccessful. Recent aid agreements worth hundreds of millions of dollars were conditional on reform (Bush and Jamal forthcoming). Moreover, the monarchy saw women's political participation as a clear indicator of progress for the state that would impact its international image (Al Shalabi and Al-Assad 2011) . Ultimately, the legislature was expanded from 110 to 120, and women's seats were doubled from 6 to 12.
However, many civil society groups remained dissatisfied with the reforms. The new 10% quota fell short of the 30% threshold some activists had demanded. And although women candidates were both more numerous and better received by voters in 2010 than in previous years, only one woman was elected outside of the reserved seats (Al Shalabi and Al-Assad 2011) . Moreover, even though there were now 12 women elected, once again no woman was elected to represent Amman.
Following massive waves of protest in 2010 and 2011, King Abdullah initiated constitutional reform in May 2011, again providing women's activists with an opportunity to make demands for guaranteed representation (de Silva de Alwis 2013). In 2012, the monarchy reformed the electoral code, this time creating a nested quota for Bedouin women. The number of reserved seats was increased to 15, one for each of the 12 governorates and the 3 tribal areas. The nested quota had for women had specific effects on the political behavior of Bedouin women. Indeed, in the 2013 elections, the Bedouin areas had the highest number of women as a percentage of all candidates. 6 So, why did Jordan adopt a nested quota for Bedouin women? First, as with countries elsewhere in the world (Bush 2011; Krook 2009; Hughes, Krook, and Paxton forthcoming) , pressure from domestic and international organizations to include more women in politics is likely part of the story. But, Jordan could have bowed to international pressure by upping the number of seats to 15 without setting aside 3 seats for Bedouin districts. So, this explanation does not help us to understand the specifics of Jordan's 2012 reforms.
A second explanation involves key concerns of women's and human rights activists. Some activists were particularly frustrated by the tendency of the quota to exclude women from urban districts, especially from Amman. By reforming the quota to assign one woman to each district, including tribal areas, a woman from Amman would be guaranteed a seat in parliament. It is thus possible that the 2012 reform to the Jordan's quota system was not about the particular needs or electoral fortunes of Bedouin women at all. Instead, the reform was a way to address the specific concerns of activists without putting in place a more expansive quota (say 25 or 30 percent of seats).
A third explanation has to do with the historic balance of power in Jordan. Women's groups are not the only ones to be frustrated by the differential sizing of electoral districts. Electoral districts in Jordan are designed to promote the representation of some groups -Trans-Jordanian and Bedouins, who live in rural and underpopulated areas -over others -Palestinians, who tend to live in urban areas. Bedouins, in particular, have long formed a bedrock of support for the Hashemite monarchy that has ruled Jordan since independence. Expanding Bedouin women's representation may mean increasing the chances of electing loyalist women. These politics are not unlike the other case where indigenous women have targeted quotas, Afghanistan. Kuchi nomads are ethnically Pashtun, Afghanistan's historically ruling group. Some claim the Kuchi quota represents an attempt by the ruling government to maintain power. So, is the Jordanian case just a copycat of Afghanistan?
At first glance, it seems the answer is no. In fact, Jordan's nested quota reads as potentially the first ever country to take a quota for women and explicitly require that a subset of women's seats go to those from ethnic minority or indigenous groups. In Afghanistan, for example, of the 10 seats set aside 6 In Bedouin districts, women were 37 percent candidates: 7 of 19 (37%) in the Northern district, 8 of 17 (47%) in the Central district, and 5 of 18 (28%) in the Southern district (National Committee for Women's Affairs 2013).
for Kuchis, 3 go to women. Kuchi women are elected through the Kuchi rolls. In contrast, in Jordan, the quota is described much differently: of the 15 seats set aside for women, 3 go to Bedouins. Bedouin women are elected using the same mechanism as all other women.
That the quota for Bedouin women is a gender quota (and not a quota for Bedouins) is even expressed in the math. To date, all known sources describing the 2012 electoral law as reserving 6 seats for Bedouins and 15 seats for women, 3 of whom come from Bedouin districts. The new system reserves 9 seats for Bedouins, but Bedouin women are not included in the count of Bedouin seats. The politics of Jordan make it clear why constructing the quota as an increase in the gender quota (rather than an increase in the Bedouin quota) is advantageous for the state. In a political context where the overrepresentation of Bedouins is already unpopular, upping seats for Bedouins is unlikely to go over well.
Conclusion
Indigenous women face many obstacles to political empowerment. In this paper, I consider how indigenous quotas and gender quotas influence the political outcomes of indigenous women. Neither type of quota appears to be a roadblock to indigenous women. But, there are no guarantees that women's seats will go to indigenous groups or that indigenous seats will go to women. As states implement these two types of policies, they must remember that targeted groups are not homogeneous and take steps to consider within-group inequalities.
Alternatively, nested quotas for indigenous women do guarantee that indigenous women are elected. However, examining the logic behind the adoption of the nested quota for Bedouin women in Jordan suggests that promoting Bedouin women's representation may not have been the sole or even primary motivation for the policy's adoption. Jordan also provides evidence that quotas are not always a tool for social and political transformation. Even when quotas are successful at increasing women's numerical presence, power structures can be resistant to change (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008; Lépinard 2006) . Quotas may even reinforce traditional power structures (Baldez 2004; Meena 2003) .
Concerns about the true motives and real effects of gender quotas are common across the Middle East and North Africa, where regimes are not fully democratic (Abou-Zeid 2006; Welborne 2010) . For example, Abou-Zeid (2006) has critiqued quotas as creating loyalists, or "puppet parliamentarians". It comes as no surprise, then, that many Arab feminists are wary of quotas the best route to women's empowerment (Bush and Jamal 2011) . Still, the circumstances surrounding the adoption of Jordan's nested quota do not mean that indigenous quotas for women cannot be adopted and implemented in a broader range of contexts. In many places in the world, indigenous women are in need of a leg up, and nested quotas for indigenous women may be a way to get there.
